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We consider patent pool formation by owners of essential patents
for diﬀerentiated standards that may be complements or substitutes in
use. Pooling improves coordination in terms of royalty setting within a
standard but provokes a strategic response from licensors in the com-
peting standard. We characterise the incentives to form and defect
from pools within standards and show how pool formation and stability
depend on competition between standards. We also examine strategic
patent pool formation by consortium standards and show that policies
promoting compatibility of standards may increase or decrease welfare
depending on the eﬀects on the incentives to form pools.
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11 Introduction
In high-technology industries, standards are often deﬁned by a number of
essential patents. Examples include the MPEG2 (video compression), DVD
and 3G mobile telephony standards (Aoki & Nagaoka, 2005). The essential
patents are by deﬁnition perfect complements in production of goods based
on the standard. In such a situation, the incentives for the patent owners
to form a pool, the welfare beneﬁts of a pool, and the incentives for pool
members to defect from a pool are well known (Lerner & Tirole, 2004,
Shapiro, 2001, Aoki & Nagaoka, 2005).
The existing literature on the economics of patent pools for standards
considers pool formation by a single standard in isolation. In this paper
we examine formation of patent pools between diﬀerentiated standards that
compete for licensees in a downstream market. Examples include competi-
tion between the HD-DVD and Blu-ray second-generation DVD standards,
and GSM and CDMA mobile telephony standards, among others. We exam-
ine the implications of the downstream strategic interaction between com-
peting standards for the upstream formation of pools within standards.
Our analysis is similar to Beggs (1994) who considers ﬁrms selling prod-
ucts that are complementary within certain groups but substitutes between
groups, such as the suppliers of components in competing computer sys-
tems.1 He considers the incentives of these ﬁrms to price jointly within
a group, which is analogous to formation of a patent pool. The tradeoﬀ
underlying the incentive to price jointly is that doing so beneﬁts the ﬁrms
within a group by improving coordination, but also provokes a strategic re-
action from the competing system that makes ﬁrms worse oﬀ. A similar
issue occurs with patent pools. Pooling reduces the total royalty charged
by a standard as it eliminates the ‘anticommons’ problem. However, this
induces licensors in the competing standard to set lower royalties when the
standards are substitutes or higher royalties when they are complements.
These inter-standard eﬀects oﬀset the intra-standard gains from pooling.
Our analysis extends Beggs’s in a number of ways that provide additional
understanding of the economics of patent pool formation among competing
standards. In particular, Begg’s analysis is conﬁned to the case where there
are two ﬁrms in each system, competing systems are substitutes in use, and
focuses on the incentives to price jointly within competing systems. We
allow for standards to be complementary or compatible in downstream use
and allow many essential patents in each standard. We also consider not
only the incentive to form a patent pool, but the stability of pools and the
incentive to defect from a pool when standards compete. We show how the
strategic eﬀects between standards aﬀect the incentive for pool members
to defect in such a way that makes the success of patent pools likely to
1See also the discussion of supermarkets in Armstrong (2006).
2be correlated when standards are substitutes but inversely correlated when
they are complements or highly compatible.
Beggs considers a simultaneous decision between groups to price jointly.
We also consider pool formation games among consortium standards. We
extend his analysis by showing how the incentives to pool depend on the
number of patents in each pool and compatibility of standards. We also add
a sequential version of the game where one consortium chooses whether to
form a patent pool before the other. In this case, we show that the consor-
tium which moves ﬁrst has a greater incentive to form a pool when standards
are complements or highly compatible, but a weaker incentive when they are
substitutes. Intuitively, not pooling is a way for a consortium to commit to
high royalties, which is generally desirable for the patent owners when the
standards are substitutes, but not desirable when they are complements.
We also present a policy analysis which interprets the degree of sub-
stitutability between standards as a policy variable reﬂecting, for example,
policies that inﬂuence the compatibility of competing consortium standards.
Increased compatibility of standards has similar eﬀects to making standards
less substitutable through increased diﬀerentiation. In our model, as in other
models with network eﬀects, compatibility is desirable (when it is costless)
although it leads to higher equilibrium prices. However, at certain levels of
compatibility, we show that the strategic behaviour of the consortia with
respect to patent pool formation can tip from forming pools to not forming
pools, or vice versa. Since whether or not the consortia form pools aﬀects
equilibrium royalties, at certain points the gains from increased compatibil-
ity can be outweighed by a sudden increase in royalties due to the change in
strategic behaviour. This means that policies which promote compatibility
between standards are not always welfare enhancing, once the strategies of
consortia with respect to pool formation are taken into account.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section sets up the
model and characterises the equilibrium. Section 3 then considers incen-
tives for standards to form pools, incentives to defect from a pool, strategic
formation of pools between consortium standards, and analyses policies de-
signed to promote compatibility of standards. Section 4 oﬀers concluding
remarks.
2 The model and equilibrium
There are two competing standards, 1 and 2. Standard i depends on ni
essential patents, and each patent is speciﬁc to one standard. Some or
all of the patent holders for standard i may belong to a patent pool. Let
xi ∈ {1,2,...,ni} be the number of independent licensors for standard i. If
all ni patents of standard i are in a pool then xi = 1 while if no patents
belong to a pool then xi = ni. In general, if there are mi ≤ ni members of
3a pool in standard i then xi = ni − mi + 1.
Each independent licensor in each standard sets a per-unit royalty simul-
taneously and non-cooperatively. Let rk
i be the royalty charged by licensor
k = 1,2,...,xi in standard i and let ρi =
￿xi
k=1 rk
i be the total per-unit roy-
alty payable by downstream licensees of standard i. The two standards are
diﬀerentiated from the point of view of downstream licensees and demand
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Before making speciﬁc assumptions about the demand for licenses, it is
useful to examine the general determinants of equilibrium royalty revenues.
Suppose a symmetric equilibrium exists where rk
i = r∗
i (xi,xj) for all k, so
that the total equilibrium royalty for standard i is ρ∗
i = xir∗
i (xi,xj) and
the equilibrium revenues of a licensor in standard i are π∗
i (xi,xj). For the
sake of illustration, suppose that xi and xj are continuous. Then, by the
envelope theorem, the eﬀects on π∗























This shows that the eﬀect on π∗
i of a change in xi can be decomposed into
three things. The ﬁrst term is an intra-standard strategic eﬀect where the
other licensors in standard i change their royalties, which aﬀects demand for
licenses from standard i. Second is an inter-standard strategic eﬀect where
licensors in standard j change their royalties in response to the change in
royalties for standard i, which also aﬀects the demand for licenses from
standard i. Finally there is the direct eﬀect that the number of license
payments per unit of standard i increases, which reduces demand for licenses.
Similarly, a change in xj has a direct eﬀect and two strategic eﬀects on π∗
i.
These three eﬀects underlie much of the analysis that follows.
For the remainder of this paper, we assume a representative downstream
user of the standards has a simple quadratic gross welfare function of the
form








where γ ∈ (−1,1).2 This type of function is commonly used to describe
diﬀerentiated products, where γ measures the extent to which the products
are complements or substitutes. In general, two standards could be comple-
ments or substitutes in downstream use. The value of a standard to a user
may also exhibit network eﬀects, where the value increases with the num-
ber of users of the standard. With network eﬀects, compatibility between
standards becomes important. If the standards are compatible, then the
network beneﬁts experienced by users of one standard will depend on the
usage of both standards.
2The same basic setup is used by Beggs (1994) with the restriction that γ > 0.
4In the case of network eﬀects between standards, product diﬀerentia-
tion and compatibility between competing standards have similar eﬀects
for determining the demand for a standard at given prices (see, for exam-
ple, Doganoglu & Wright, 2006). This is because compatibility reduces the
sensitivity of a network’s demand to changes in its own price, as when it
raises prices for example, it loses some customers to the other network, but
the remaining customers are still able to ‘communicate’ with those who
switched networks, while that would not be possible if the networks were
incompatible. Thus compatibility generally augments product diﬀerentia-
tion, softens competition between networks, and leads to higher prices. Put
another way, compatibility makes standards less substitutable, everything
else equal. This does not necessarily harm consumers or welfare, however,
as there are beneﬁts associated with having access to a larger network.
In general, compatibility between networks can take varying degrees. In
our model, we interpret γ as summarising the extent to which the two stan-
dards are complements or substitutes in downstream use, and the extent to
which they are compatible. If standards are close substitutes in downstream
use, then γ will be larger, while if they are complements it will be smaller. A
high degree of compatibility between standards also implies a smaller value
of γ. Later we will interpret γ as a parameter that can be inﬂuenced by
policy towards compatibility of standards.
Since a downstream user must pay ρi per unit to use standard i, the
representative user chooses q1 and q2 to maximise W (q1,q2) − ρ1q1 − ρ2q2.






1 − γ − ρi + γρj
1 − γ2 . (1)
Aside from the royalties, we assume for simplicity there are no other down-
stream or upstream costs of production. The ﬁrst-order condition for an










i = 0. (2)
We consider equilibria where all independent licensors in standard i set a
symmetric royalty, so that rk
i = r∗
i for all k and for i = 1,2. In this case,
ρi = xir∗
i and from (1) and (2) the equilibrium is given by
1 − γ − xir∗
i + γxjr∗
j
1 − γ2 −
r∗
i
1 − γ2 = 0 for i,j = 1,2 and i ￿= j.
Solving these two equations simultaneously gives the equilibrium royalty r∗
i
set by licensors in standard i. The total equilibrium royalty per-unit payable
by a user of standard i is therefore
ρ∗
i (xi,xj) =
(1 − γ)xi (1 + xj (1 + γ))
1 + xi + xj + xixj (1 − γ2)
. (3)
5Proposition 1 The total equilibrium royalty of standard i is increasing in
xi and increasing (decreasing) in xj when γ > 0 (γ < 0).
Proof. From (3), some algebraic manipulation reveals that ρ∗
i (xi + 1,xj) >
ρ∗
i (xi,xj) when xj +1 > 0 which is always true. Similarly, ρ∗
i (xi,xj + 1) ≥
ρ∗
i (xi,xj) when γ (1 + xi (1 + γ)) ≥ 0 which is true when γ ≥ 0 and false
when γ < 0.
The fact that ρ∗
i increases in xi is the standard ‘tragedy of the anticom-
mons’ result (Buchanan & Yoon, 2000, Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). Licenses
from the xi independent licensors of standard i are perfect complements in
its downstream use. As a result, the greater is xi, the greater is the total
royalty for that standard, because each individual licensor does not take
account of the negative eﬀect that raising her royalty has on demand for
licenses from the other licensors within the same standard.
The equilibrium total royalty of standard i also increases with xj if down-
stream users view the standards as substitutes (γ > 0). In this case, an
increase in xj raises ρ∗
j due to the anticommons eﬀect among standard j
licensors and since total royalties of the two standards are strategic comple-
ments this also induces an increase in equilibrium royalties by licensors in
standard i. If the standards are complements or compatibility is suﬃciently
important (γ < 0), the two standards are strategic substitutes, and a higher
ρ∗
j due to an increase in xj causes standard i licensors to respond by lowering
their royalties.









i. From (1) and (3) we have
π∗
i (xi,xj) =
(1 − γ)(1 + xj (1 + γ))
2
(1 + γ)(1 + xi + xj + xixj (1 − γ2))
2. (4)
Proposition 2 Equilibrium revenues of a licensor in standard i are always
decreasing in xi, and are increasing (decreasing) in xj when γ > 0 (γ < 0).
Proof. From (4), algebraic manipulation reveals that π∗
i (xi + 1,xj) <
π∗
i (xi,xj) when 1 + xj
￿
1 − γ2￿
> 0 which is always true. Similarly, we
have π∗
i (xi,xj + 1) ≥ π∗
i (xi,xj) when γ (1 + xi (1 + γ)) ≥ 0 which is true
when γ ≥ 0 and false when γ < 0.
Intuitively, as discussed above, an increase in xi makes the tragedy of the
anticommons worse within standard i, forcing up equilibrium royalties to the
detriment of licensors of that standard. In addition, an increase in xj causes
royalties for standard j to increase, and if the standards are substitutes
then this beneﬁts licensors in standard i, but harms them if standards are
complements or highly compatible.
63 Analysis of patent pools
So far, we have not speciﬁed who the licensors within each standard are,
only that they act independently. Now suppose that an individual licensor
in standard may either be a patent pool or an independent patent holder.
An independent patent holder’s equilibrium revenues are simply π∗
i (xi,xj).
We assume that pools distribute their revenue equally to the patent holders
that are members. The number of pool members in standard i is ni−xi+1,
thus a pool member receives π∗
i (xi,xj)/(ni − xi + 1).
3.1 Incentives to form and maintain pools
First, consider the eﬀects of pool formation on the patent holders in stan-
dard i, taking xj as given. We are interested in the incentive to form a pool,
and the incentive for members of a pool to break out and become indepen-
dent licensors, when in competition with another standard. We consider the
formation of a complete pool (xi = 1) versus independent royalty setting by
all members of standard i (xi = ni). In this case, the gains to an individ-
ual patent holder from pool formation in standard i given xj independent
licensors in standard j are
∆P = π∗
i (1,xj)/ni − π∗
i (ni,xj). (5)














It is easy to verify that the right-hand side of (6) is always positive for
ni ≥ 1 and xj ≥ 1, and is always less than 1. So for some range of γ
around zero, forming a pool is beneﬁcial for standard i patent holders, for
any given xj. However, for suﬃciently extreme values of γ, the standard i
patent holders are better oﬀ remaining as individual licensors. Beggs (1994)
ﬁnds similar results for suppliers of systems. These results come from a
basic tradeoﬀ in pool formation when standards compete. Pooling allows
patent holders within a standard to internalise the externalities that result
in the tragedy of the anticommons, which is beneﬁcial for them. Thus
pooling is always worthwhile when the standards are independent (γ = 0).
However, if standards are substitutes, for example, then the reduction in
standard i’s royalty caused by forming a pool induces a strategic reaction
of lower royalties set by the licensors in standard j. When standards are
substitutes, this hurts the patent holders in standard i and oﬀsets the gains
from pooling. Similarly, if standards are complements or compatibility is
high, when standard i’s royalty reduces from pooling it induces standard j
to set higher royalties, which also hurts the patent holders in standard i.
7Therefore, the decision to form a pool depends on the balance of the
positive intra-standard eﬀects from eliminating the tragedy of the anticom-
mons versus the negative inter-standard strategic eﬀects. The inequality
(6) summarises the factors that inﬂuence this tradeoﬀ. The right-hand side
is increasing in ni, as the greater the number of independent licensors that
exist in standard i without a pool, the greater are the beneﬁts from over-
coming the tragedy of the anticommons by pooling. Thus pooling becomes
more likely when ni is high. The inequality is also more likely to be satis-
ﬁed if xj is low or γ is small in absolute value. Either of these means that
the strategic reaction from standard j in terms of its change in royalties
in response to standard i forming a pool is smaller. As this inter-standard
strategic reaction always oﬀsets the gains from pooling, thus a smaller reac-
tion makes pooling more worthwhile. The following proposition summarises
these results.
Proposition 3 Pool formation is always beneﬁcial for patent holders in a
standard for values of γ suﬃciently close to zero that satisfy (6). In addition,
for given γ, pool formation is more likely to be beneﬁcial for patent holders
in a standard if the standard involves many patents (ni is large) or there are
fewer independent licensors in the competing standard (xj is small).
In general, patent pools are inherently unstable because each member
can often do better as an independent licensor due to the complementarity
of patents. If standard i has formed a complete pool (xi = 1) the gains to
an individual patent holder from unilaterally defecting are
∆D = π∗
i (2,xj) − π∗
i (1,xj)/ni.
Proposition 4 The gains for a patent owner in standard i from defecting
from a complete pool are always positive when ni ≥ 3 and are positive for
ni = 2 if γ2 and/or xj are suﬃciently large. In addition, when ni ≥ 3, ∆D
increases (decreases) with xj when γ > 0 (γ < 0).
Proof. In the appendix.
Intuitively, defecting from the pool causes the standard’s royalty to rise
beyond the joint optimum. This reduces the per-licensor proﬁt in standard
i, but since the defector gets to keep all of the proﬁt rather than sharing it
with the other pool members, the basic incentive to defect (if γ = 0 and the
standards were independent) is always positive in this model unless ni = 2.
Defection also induces a strategic response of higher royalties from standard
j when γ > 0 and lower royalties when γ < 0, and these strategic eﬀects can
make the net gain from defection positive.
From proposition 2, both π∗
i (2,xj) and π∗
i (1,xj)/ni increase with xj
if γ > 0 and decrease if γ < 0. If ni is large enough (ni ≥ 3) then the
eﬀect of higher xj on π∗
i (2,xj) always outweighs the eﬀect on π∗
i (1,xj)/ni
8and the change in the incentive to defect when xj increases has the same
sign as γ. Otherwise, if ni = 2 the eﬀect on the incentive to defect is
ambiguous and may increase or decrease depending on the values of γ and
xj. Overall, proposition 4 suggests that, with suﬃciently many patents
involved in each standard, if standards are substitutes then an increased
number of independent licensors in standard j makes it more diﬃcult to
maintain a pool in standard i. In other words, with substitute standards
the success of patent pools are likely to be correlated across standards. If
one standard is able to maintain a low number of independent licensors due
to pooling, this reduces the incentive for members of a pool in the other
standard to defect from the pool, due to the strategic interaction between
pools. On the other hand, if standards are complements in downstream use
(or compatibility is high), there should be an inverse correlation between
the success of the pools.
3.2 Strategic pool formation
Proposition 3 indicates that patent pool formation may be beneﬁcial for the
IP owners in a standard, but this depends on whether or not the competing
standard also forms a pool, the intensity of competition between the pools,
whether or not the standards are substitutes or complements in downstream
use and the degree of compatibility between standards. To address the pool
formation issue in more detail, we consider a multi-stage game of pool for-
mation between consortium standards, where two consortia choose whether
or not to pool the essential patents within each standard before competing
in the downstream market for licenses. For simplicity, we assume that the
number of patents is the same in each standard, so that n1 = n2 = n. We
consider the cases where the consortia choose whether to form pools simul-
taneously, and where one consortium moves ﬁrst. In either case, we assume
the two consortia choose between two strategies of forming a complete pool
(xi = 1) or licensing all patents independently (xi = n).
When consortia choose whether to form pools simultaneously, we look
for a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game by solving the ﬁrst stage
assuming that each consortium maximises the total royalty revenues of the
patent owners for that standard in the second stage of competition between
standards. Thus, for example, if standard 1 forms a pool and standard 2
does not, the payoﬀ of standard 1 is π∗ (1,n) and the payoﬀ of standard 2
is nπ∗ (n,1). The normal form of this game is as follows:
Std. 2
Pool No Pool
Std. Pool π∗ (1,1) , π∗ (1,1) π∗ (1,n) , nπ∗ (n,1)
1 No Pool nπ∗ (n,1) , π∗ (1,n) nπ∗ (n,n) , nπ∗ (n,n)
Forming a pool is a best reply to the other consortium pooling when
9π∗ (1,1) ≥ nπ∗ (n,1). From (4), after some manipulation, this is true for
γ ∈ [max{−1,−γ (n)},min{1,γ (n)}], where
γ (n) =
￿






















Figure 1 sketches these inequalities, assuming that n is continuous for
simplicity. If γ is low in absolute value, the inter-standard strategic response
in terms of higher royalties from consortium j in response to consortium i
forming a pool is relatively small. In this case, the gains from reducing
the anticommons eﬀect within standard i by forming a pool outweigh the
strategic eﬀects between standards, regardless of whether the other standard
pools or not. Thus pooling is a dominant strategy and the only equilibrium
is for both consortia to form pools. Similarly, if γ is relatively high (and
n < 4), it is a dominant strategy for both consortia not to pool as the
negative eﬀects of the inter-standard strategic response always outweigh any
coordination gains within a standard.3
If γ takes intermediate values given n < 4 or high values for n ≥ 4, the
two consortia wish to coordinate their actions with regard to pooling. In
this case there are two pure strategy equilibria, where both consortia pool
or both do not pool, as well as a mixed strategy equilibrium. This arises
because the number of independent licensors in standard j aﬀects the size
of the inter-standard strategic response to pool formation by consortium
i. If consortium j does not pool, it contains more independent licensors
and the inter-standard strategic response to consortium i forming a pool is
larger compared to when consortium j also pools. This means that, for such
values of γ, whether or not the inter-standard strategic eﬀect outweighs the
intra-standard coordination gains within a standard depends on whether the
competing standard is a pool. Proposition 5 summarises the equilibria when
consortia choose whether or not to form pools simultaneously.
Proposition 5 In the simultaneous move pool formation game, the equilib-






0 for γ ∈ (min{γ (n),1},1) ∪ (max{−γ (n),−1},−1)
{0,￿ σ,1} for γ ∈ [γ (n),min{γ (n),1}) ∪ [−γ (n),max{−γ (n),−1})




3Beggs (1994) also considers the simultaneous version of a similar game and ﬁnds
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Figure 1: Illustration of the best reply regions in the simultaneous pool
formation game between two consortium standards.
with
￿ σ =
nπ∗ (n,n) − π∗ (1,n)
π∗ (1,1) − nπ∗ (n,1) + nπ∗ (n,n) − π∗ (1,n)
.
If the timing of the ﬁrst stage of the game is sequential rather than si-
multaneous then the consortium that moves ﬁrst can inﬂuence the outcome
in the case when there are multiple equilibria. The pure strategy equilibria
of both standards pooling or both not pooling exist for the same param-
eter values where these are dominant strategies in the simultaneous move
game. For the mixed strategy parameter regions of the simultaneous move
game, in a sequential game the consortium that moves second will mimic
the strategy with regards to pooling of the consortium that moved ﬁrst, due
to the desirability of coordinating the strategies of the standards towards
forming pools. In this case, the consortium that moves ﬁrst can eﬀectively
decide whether both pool or not, depending on which outcome has a higher
payoﬀ. Thus in the mixed strategy region, the ﬁrst mover will choose to
pool if π∗ (1,1) ≥ nπ∗ (n,n). From (4), this occurs if γ ≤ ￿ γ (n) where
￿ γ (n) =











for all n ≥ 1. Figure 2 illustrates
the equilibrium strategies as a function of γ, for a given n in the sequen-
tial pool formation game. This shows that there is an asymmetry around
zero in the range of γ for which consortia form patent pools in equilibrium.
The consortia are more likely to pool in a subgame perfect equilibrium if
11γ ( ) n γ − ( ) n γ − 0 −1 1 ( ) n γ ~ ( ) n γ ( ) n γ
Both standards do not pool Both standards do not pool Both standards pool Both standards pool





































Figure 3: Equilibrium probabilities of forming patent pools in the simulta-
neous (left) and sequential (right) versons of the game, for n = 3.
they are complements or if compatibility is high (γ < 0) compared to if
they are substitutes (γ > 0). This is because, from proposition 2, pooling
by consortium j beneﬁts consortium i when the standards are complements
(or highly compatible), but not when they are substitutes. This eﬀect tips





. Put another way, not forming a pool is a way for a
consortium to commit to setting a high total royalty for its standard. If stan-
dards are substitutes this softens competition between them and increases
royalty revenues, and thus the standard that moves ﬁrst has a tendency to-
wards not pooling unless γ is relatively close to zero so that strategic eﬀects
between standards are relatively small. However, if the standards are com-
plements then a commitment to lower royalties by pooling is preferred when
inter-standard eﬀects are strong. Proposition 6 summarises the subgame
perfect equilibria in the sequential move game.
Proposition 6 In a subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential move pool









Figure 3 graphs the equilibrium probabilities of forming patent pools
in the simultaneous and sequential versions of the game, using the equilib-
rium completely mixed strategy when there are multiple equilibria in the
simultaneous version, for n = 3. To interpret the results in the simultane-
ous case, consider what happens starting from γ = 0. At that point, the
standards are independent and each consortium prefers to form a patent
12pool regardless of what the other standard does. As γ increases, say, the
inter-standard strategic reactions increase in importance. Since the size of
the strategic reaction also depends on whether or not the competing stan-
dard forms a pool, at some value of γ, each standard prefers to pool if and
only if the other standard also pools. In terms of the payoﬀs, as γ crosses
γ (n), π∗ (1,1) remains greater than nπ∗ (n,1) while nπ∗ (n,n) slightly ex-
ceeds π∗ (1,n). This pushes the equilibrium probability of pooling, given by
￿ σ, close to zero. As γ increases further, the increasing importance of the
inter-standard strategic eﬀects causes the diﬀerence between π∗ (1,1) and
nπ∗ (n,1) to fall, while the diﬀerence between nπ∗ (n,n) and π∗ (1,n) in-
creases, so the probability of pooling in a mixed strategy equilibrium must
rise. Finally, as γ crosses γ (n), the inter-standard strategic eﬀects become
so important that not pooling becomes a dominant strategy, and the equilib-
rium probability of pooling falls to zero. Within the mixed strategy region,
strategic eﬀects between standards are strong enough that coordination of
the decision to pool or not becomes the most important factor. Outside this
region, inter-standard eﬀects are either so small that they do not aﬀect the
decision to form a pool, or are so great that they dominate the decision,
leading to dominant strategy equilibria.
3.3 Policy analysis
One of the important policy issues with competing consortium standards
is the extent to which standards should be encouraged to be compatible in
downstream use. As discussed earlier, we can interpret γ as the combined
eﬀect on the welfare of downstream users of the degree of diﬀerentiation of
the standards and the extent to which they are compatible. Policies that
promote compatibility thus imply lower values of γ, everything else equal.
To illustrate the eﬀects of such policies, ﬁgure 4 graphs the equilibrium
royalties as functions of γ in the simultaneous and sequential versions of
the game for n = 3, using the mixed strategy equilibrium and calculating
the expected royalty in the case where there are multiple equilibria in the
simultaneous game.
In general, increased diﬀerentiation or increased compatibility of stan-
dards causes equilibrium royalties to rise, due to the softening of competition
between the two standards. In addition, at some values of γ the nature of
the strategic interactions between standards means that equilibrium royal-
ties jump as the strategic pooling behaviour of the standards switches from
one regime to another. Although royalties generally increase when γ re-
duces, this does not necessarily mean that welfare decreases, since increased
compatibility of standards yields additional beneﬁts to downstream users
even if royalties are higher. However, the sudden increases in royalties due
to changing strategic behaviour of the standards can outweigh any gains
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Figure 4: Equilibrium royalties in the simultaneous (left) and sequential
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Figure 5: Equilibrium expected welfare in the simultaneous pool formation
game, for n = 3 and γ < 0 (left) or γ > 0 (right).
5 shows the equilibrium expected welfare in the simultaneous version of the
pool formation game for negative and positive values of γ when n = 3.
This model thus suggests that any analysis of policies designed to make
standards more compatible must take account of the strategic behaviour of
standards with regard to patent pool formation. The model also suggests
when such regime switches are likely to occur and aﬀect policy analysis.
Dominant strategy equilibria occur when inter-standard strategic eﬀects are
either relatively strong or relatively weak, that is, for relatively low or high
(absolute) values of γ, given n. In particular, from ﬁgure 1, a regime switch
will not occur for small changes of γ between −γ (n) and γ (n), or γ outside
of ±γ (n) (when this is less than ±1 in absolute value). Thus if the inter-
standard demand linkages are relatively weak or relatively strong, small
changes in γ will likely not aﬀect the strategic pooling behaviour of stan-
dards. The region of stable dominant strategy equilibria also increases with
n as this increases the importance of inter-standard strategic eﬀects.
144 Conclusion
Existing models of patent pool formation by standards ignore competition
between standards. Our analysis shows that the strategic interaction be-
tween standards adds an extra dimension to the eﬀects of pooling. For
example, not pooling is a way of committing to high royalties between com-
peting consortium standards and this may outweigh the gains to patent own-
ers from pooling within a standard when standards are substitutes. This is
a possible explanation why socially beneﬁcial pools may not form. How-
ever, if standards are complementary or highly compatible in downstream
use, there are gains to coordinating on lower royalties through pooling. Our
analysis also implies that success of pools are likely to be positively corre-
lated when standards are substitutes and negatively correlated when they
are complements or highly compatible.
Consortium standards may also form pools for strategic reasons. If inter-
standard eﬀects are weak or strong, the strategic behaviour of each consor-
tium with respect to pooling is independent of the other. However, for
intermediate parameter regions, coordination eﬀects between standards be-
come relatively important. If one standard moves ﬁrst with respect to pool
formation, this may be an attempt to encourage or discourage a competing
standard from pooling, depending on whether the standards are substitutes
or complements in downstream use. These strategic eﬀects also have im-
plications for policies that promote compatibility of standards, and while
compatibility is broadly desirable in our model, the beneﬁts can be out-
weighed by increases in royalties if higher compatibility causes consortia
change their behaviour with respect to forming patent pools.
5 Appendix
Proof of proposition 4
From (4), ∆D ≥ 0 if
xj (2 −
√
ni)γ2 + (xj + 1)(2
√
ni − 3) ≥ 0
The left-hand side is a quadratic in γ. For ni = 3 or ni = 4 this inequality
always hold since the coeﬃcient on γ2 is weakly positive and the constant













For ni > 4 the coeﬃcient on γ2 is negative and these roots lie outside the











the inequality holds for all γ ∈ (−1,1). For ni = 2, the coeﬃcient on
15γ2 is positive and the roots lie within (−1,1). Furthermore, the roots are
decreasing in xj.
Finally, to show that ∆D increases in xj when γ > 0 and decreases when
γ < 0, it is easier to assume that xj is continuous. From (4), after some





(3 + xj + 2xj (1 − γ2))
3 −
γ + 2
ni (2 + xj + xj (1 − γ2))
3
￿




3 + xj + 2xj
￿
1 − γ2￿￿3
(2γ + 3)(2 + xj + xj (1 − γ2))
3
and it is straightforward to verify that the right-hand side is always less than
3 for xj ≥ 1 and γ ∈ (−1,1). Thus the sign of ∂∆D/∂xj is the same as the
sign of γ.
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